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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a common law system where cases play an important role in legal 
problem-solving, lawyers must be able to synthesize ideas from groups of cases 
to determine a jurisdiction‟s law at a particular point in time.  In reality, 
however, not all lawyers are able to synthesize well enough for sophisticated 
law practice.  Some lawyers understand and use this skill intuitively but do not 
consciously think about the steps they actually take.  Lawyers in this group 
often do not sufficiently value case synthesis because this skill seems so 
obvious, and thus they do not necessarily use this skill to its full potential.  
Other lawyers do not intuitively understand how to synthesize cases and have 
never learned a methodology to do so.  Lawyers in this group simply are not 
able to manipulate case law adequately and consequently fail to produce the 
necessary depth of analysis to represent their clients effectively. 
This Article‟s goal, therefore, is to promote a better understanding of the 
theory behind synthesizing cases as well as an awareness of the methodology 
necessary to use this skill properly and to its full potential.  This Article is 
written from the point of view of lawyers synthesizing cases in law practice for 
the obvious reason that lawyers must draw on this skill all the time.  However, 
this Article is equally valuable for teachers in law schools who must prepare 
their students for their careers.
1
 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Only law school courses, whether doctrinal or legal writing or clinical or legal method, that use a 
curriculum based on simulated or actual problems in particular jurisdictions are able to teach students the 
analytical skill of case synthesis as presented in this Article—synthesizing cases to determine the particular 
law of a particular jurisdiction at a specific point in time.  Law school courses that teach the doctrine of a 
specific subject area in a traditional manner are not able to instruct students in this skill because this type of 
course focuses on “national law” where students work with legal authority from multiple jurisdictions.  
Working with thematic ideas from cases across jurisdictional lines results in syntheses that necessarily capture 
the broad strokes of doctrine and policy underpinnings of the particular legal subject area, which is a process 
that is obviously valuable for teaching law students how to think about the law.  It does not, however, allow 
students to work within the boundaries of synthesizing cases of a particular jurisdiction as lawyers must do to 
represent clients in practice.  See A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
SOURCEBOOK ON LEGAL WRITING PROGRAMS 7-8 (Eric B. Easton ed., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing the 
complementary nature of traditional doctrinal and legal analysis and writing courses‟ approaches to teaching 
analytical skills in the first-year law school curriculum); see also Jane Kent Gionfriddo, The “Reasonable 
Zone of Right Answers”: Analytical Feedback on Student Writing, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 427, 432 n.17 (2004-
2005) (comparing the approaches of traditional doctrinal and legal writing courses to teaching analytical 
skills); cf. Richard K. Greenstein, Teaching Case Synthesis, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 8-14 (1985-1986) 
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Part II provides general background about how lawyers synthesize legal 
authority, with a particular focus on synthesizing cases and why this skill is so 
important for the practice of law.
2
  Part III describes a methodology for lawyers 
synthesizing cases that is thorough, yet flexible enough to generate the subtle 
nuances of analysis necessary for sophisticated problem-solving.
3
  Part IV 
illustrates this methodology using a group of hypothetical cases that have been 
carefully designed to demonstrate the complex permutations of synthesizing 
cases in an actual problem-solving context.
4
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The word “synthesis” comes from the Greek word “syntithenai” which 
means “to put together.”5  A modern definition of “synthesis,” therefore, is “the 
composition or combination of parts or elements so as to form a whole.”6  In the 
law, this idea of synthesis comes into play as lawyers, in their many roles, 
analyze groups of legal authority to determine reasonable interpretations of 
law.
7
 
Lawyers begin this process of synthesis by first identifying the pieces of 
authority relevant to a legal issue and then fitting these pieces together to 
determine the overall analytical framework they reasonably support.
8
  This step 
requires understanding the nature and hierarchy of authority in our legal 
system.
9
  Our system, for example, mandates that a legal issue is governed first 
by a relevant constitutional statute.
10
  Here, cases become important only 
secondarily to provide judicial interpretations of the statute and its 
application.
11
  This situation, then, is different from one when the legislature of 
                                                                                                                 
(criticizing the traditional doctrinal course approach to teaching students how to synthesize cases in 
comparison to the approach in a problem-based course).  But see Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single 
Instances: Inductive Inference in Law, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 380-91 (1998); Paul T. Wangerin, Skills 
Training in “Legal Analysis”: A Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 409, 442-48 (1986) [hereinafter 
Wangerin, Skills Training] (discussing the process of synthesizing cases but failing to adequately distinguish 
between the situation of synthesizing cases from different jurisdictions, as occurs in a traditional doctrinal 
course, and the situation of synthesizing cases from one jurisdiction, as a lawyer would do). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. MERRIAM-WEBSTER‟S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1296 (11th ed. 2004). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 39 (1996) (discussing the process of synthesizing “rules of law into a single, coherent 
framework”); Wangerin, Skills Training, supra note 1, at 442-43 (stating that synthesizing “means bringing 
together two, three, four, or more decided cases and other legal authorities as support for a single legal idea or 
proposition”). 
 8. See infra Part IV.B. 
 9. LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS, 
RESEARCH, AND WRITING 26-27 (4th ed. 2006). 
 10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 (Yale Univ. Press 1964) 
(1921). 
 11. VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 23; CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 14. 
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the jurisdiction has never addressed the area of law, and when the legal issue 
falls squarely under the common law developed by the courts.
12
 
Once lawyers determine this overall analytical framework, they must take 
the next step of fleshing out its various components and their interrelationships. 
 Sometimes, one particular piece of authority in the jurisdiction—either a 
statute or an appellate level case—sufficiently articulates the relevant law, and a 
lawyer need go no further.  For instance, the legislature might have enacted a 
statute that unequivocally dictates a result for the lawyer‟s problem.  Similarly, 
in a single case, a court might have fully articulated the relevant common law 
doctrine, including its requirements, standards, and underlying reasoning; or a 
court might have explicitly set out its interpretation of a vague term in a statute 
and why it reached that conclusion.  In these situations, the court has explained 
its ideas with the kind of specificity that gives clear guidance to lawyers in 
future cases, despite the fact that the addition of each new case changes the law 
to some degree. 
Often, however, whether interpreting a statutory term or developing the 
common law, no single case in a jurisdiction sets out the entire approach to a 
particular area of law; instead, over time different cases add individual ideas 
that must be combined, or in other words synthesized, to see the entire picture 
of the analysis.  Each individual case is less important as a discrete unit than as 
a component of the entire group.  For this reason, lawyers must be able to 
analyze not only individual cases and what they may add to a particular area of 
law as a single case, but also groups of relevant cases for the same purpose.
13
  
                                                                                                                 
 12. CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 18-19. 
 13. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 41-49 (Oceana Publ‟ns, 
Inc. 1996) (1930).  Lawyers must begin by reading critically and analyzing each one of the relevant cases as a 
separate, individual unit.  This step requires the ability to break a case down into logical, discrete parts; to 
understand each part; and then to put all the parts back together again in a manner that explains the case‟s 
significance between the parties and lays the foundation for understanding the role it will play, in conjunction 
with other cases, in the applicable law of the jurisdiction.  See id.  Professor Llewellyn, in his lectures to first-
year law students, described the process of a lawyer synthesizing cases as follows: 
That no case can have a meaning by itself!  Standing alone it gives you no guidance.  It can give 
you no guidance as to how far it carries, as to how much of its language will hold water later.  
What counts, what gives you leads, what gives you sureness, that is the background of the other 
cases in relation to which you must read the one.  They color the language, the technical terms, 
used in the opinion.  But above all they give you the wherewithal to find which of the facts are 
significant, and in what aspect they are significant, and how far the rules laid down are to be 
trusted. 
See id. at 48; see also DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, 
REASONING, AND WRITING 41 (2d ed. 2003) (“Rarely is any single case so similar to the client‟s situation that 
the lawyer can ignore other cases on the same topic.  Rather, the lawyer needs to take account of multiple 
close cases, „fusing‟ them into a single rule or pattern on that topic that then can be applied to the client‟s 
facts.”); DAVID S. ROMANTZ & KATHLEEN ELLIOTT VINSON, LEGAL ANALYSIS: THE FUNDAMENTAL SKILL 
40 (1998) ( “[C]ase synthesis provides an effective tool for lawyers to integrate a large body of case law into 
one holistic analysis.  It helps lawyers identify the common denominator among the precedents and 
streamlines the body of law into a workable cornerstone of analysis.”). 
A judge‟s process of synthesizing cases is similar to that of a lawyer.  While comparing literary 
interpretation of a text to the process of judges‟ analyzing legal precedents, Professor Dworkin observed: 
Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case before him, as a partner in a complex 
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Only in making sense of all of the cases will a lawyer be able to formulate a 
clear picture of the law to determine an appropriate solution to the legal 
problem at issue.
14
  In contrast, a lawyer may not develop a sufficient analysis 
by focusing on a single case that appears to be the most factually similar to a 
legal problem because synthesizing all the relevant cases may show the lawyer 
possibilities that analyzing one case does not.
15
 
The fact that so much of our case law requires synthesizing ideas from a 
group of cases is the result of the role of judges in our legal system.  The 
ultimate responsibility of a judge is to resolve the issue between the parties 
before the court.
16
  As part of this responsibility, a judge must make sense of 
precedent that is relevant to the decision, given the fundamental concept of 
stare decisis in our legal system;
17
 “making law” for future cases is secondary, 
or even irrelevant, to this goal.  For these reasons, judges are more likely to 
write opinions that include a sufficient degree of reasoning to support the 
immediate decision, but this reasoning may not completely clarify what the case 
specifically adds to the relevant area of law.
18
 
 Given the level of reasoning that lawyers often encounter, lawyers 
themselves must have the ability to synthesize ideas from a group of decisions 
                                                                                                                 
chain enterprise of which these innumerable decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are 
the history; it is his job to continue that history into the future through what he does on the day.  
He must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise 
in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own.  So he must determine, according 
to his own judgment, what the earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so 
far, taken as a whole, really is. 
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 543 (1982); see also CARDOZO, supra note 10, 
at 31 (observing that “[g]iven a mass of particulars, a congeries of judgments on related topics, the principle 
that unifies and rationalizes them has a tendency, and a legitimate one, to project and extend itself to new 
cases within the limits of its capacity to unify and rationalize”). 
 14. See Greenstein, supra note 1, at 1, 7; see also Henry Weihofen, Types of Questions, 23 ROCKY 
MTN. L. REV. 110, 115 (1950-1951) (observing, as part of a symposium on exam testing, that “legal synthesis 
is the ability to take a mass of cases, as a lawyer has to do, and fit them into a pattern to find the law”). 
 15. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 42. 
 16. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 40 (“[T]he court must decide the dispute that is before it.  It cannot 
refuse because the job is hard, or dubious, or dangerous.”); see also Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by 
Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 770 (2006) (“From the standpoint of the judge, . . . it is the activity of 
deciding cases.  The duty to decide is primary.”) (reviewing LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE 
OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT  (2005)). 
 17. See generally VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 32-35 (discussing the concept of stare decisis). 
 18. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 87. In discussing the role of judges in making and dealing with 
precedent, Professor Llewellyn reasoned: 
A judge makes his rule in and around a specific case, and looking backward.  The case shapes the 
rule; the judge‟s feet are firmly on the particular instance; his rule is commonly good sense, and 
very narrow.  And any innovation is confined regularly within rather narrow limits—partly by the 
practice of trying hard to square the new decision with old law; it is hard to keep daring 
innovations even verbally consistent with old rules.  And partly innovation is confined through 
conscious policy: case law rules (though new) are applied as if they had always been the law; this 
derives from our convention that “judges only declare and do not make the law.”  Knowing that 
the effect of their ruling will be retroactive, and unable to foresee how many men‟s calculations a 
new ruling may upset, the judges move very cautiously into new ground. 
Id. 
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to use the law in a sophisticated manner and, therefore, to represent their clients 
well in a wide range of situations.
19
  For instance, in a transactional situation, 
lawyers able to synthesize cases are more likely to craft document language that 
sufficiently anticipates, and therefore protects clients against, future problems.
20
 
 Similarly, lawyers able to synthesize cases are more likely to make creative 
arguments that will influence a court to reach a favorable outcome for a client.
21
 
In addition to representing their clients well, lawyers able to synthesize 
cases play a critical role in developing the law in their jurisdictions.  A lawyer‟s 
well-reasoned arguments assist the court in writing opinions in which the 
court‟s rationale is spelled out more explicitly.22  In the same vein, judges who 
consciously use a sophisticated process of synthesizing prior case law may be 
more likely to write opinions that develop, in greater depth and specificity, a 
particular area of law and that explain why that approach requires the court‟s 
disposition.
23
  These types of opinions provide better guidance to all citizens on 
the parameters of the specific area of the law, even though those parameters 
continue to change as new and different factual situations come before the 
courts.
24
 Also, legislators who are able to synthesize cases in a sophisticated 
manner are better able to craft legislation that takes into account important 
nuances in prior case law and that is, therefore, more likely to achieve the 
desired results for the citizens of the jurisdiction. 
Thus, to operate successfully in their many roles, lawyers must be able to 
synthesize groups of cases effectively.  To do so, they must understand the 
theory behind a sound and sophisticated methodology for this important 
analytical skill and be able to use it.  This understanding requires more than an 
intuitive sense of the process; it requires fully comprehending the complexities 
of synthesizing cases and practicing the methodology properly.  Part III 
describes this methodology,
25
 which is illustrated in a hypothetical problem in 
Part IV.
26
 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Greenstein, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
 20. Id. 
 21. VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 31 (stating that synthesizing a group of cases to determine the 
underlying implicit policies allows the “creative lawyer” to better represent a client before the court); 
Greenstein, supra note 1, at 5-6 (stating that a lawyer must determine a synthesis of cases from the relevant 
jurisdiction that is both plausible and helpful in representing the client in an adversary process); cf. Kristen K. 
Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 LEGAL 
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 257, 264-72 (2002) (discussing the results of a survey where federal 
judges ranked the analytical foundation of a brief as most important). 
 22. VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 31. 
 23. See Posner, supra note 16, at 761-65.  In criticizing an approach to legal reasoning too focused on 
reasoning by analogy, Judge Posner made clear the importance of lawyers and judges synthesizing prior cases 
to come up with the rules and underlying reasoning and policies that those cases support.  Id.  Implicit in 
Judge Posner‟s reasoning is that this process is important for lawyers to represent their clients well and for 
judges to come to well-reasoned decisions.  See id. 
 24. See id. at 769 (stating that “[g]reater judicial candor would make law easier for practitioners to 
understand and apply”). 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
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III.  SYNTHESIZING CASES 
A.  Introduction 
 Although lawyers must synthesize cases in a variety of contexts in the 
legal profession, the context that best illustrates this skill is the foundational 
one—a lawyer analyzing a group of cases to develop an objective analysis of 
the current status of a jurisdiction‟s law to neutrally predict what that law 
means for a client‟s situation.  For this reason, this Article focuses on the 
objective analysis context in Part III.B, and then discusses case synthesis in the 
context of making arguments to a court in Part III.C.
27
 
B.  The Process in an Objective Analysis of the Current Status of a 
Jurisdiction’s Law 
1.  Overview 
Lawyers must often objectively analyze the current status of an area of law 
in a particular jurisdiction.  When synthesizing a group of cases in this context, 
lawyers may find that much of the courts‟ approach—the general principles that 
set out the courts‟ doctrine and underlying reasoning—is explicitly 
articulated.
28
  In many situations, however, these explicit ideas will not be 
sufficient by themselves, either because they are too general as stated or 
because the courts simply leave important ideas unstated.
29
  When these 
situations occur, lawyers must look beyond the courts‟ explicit statements and 
analyze what the group of cases implies about the courts‟ approach.30 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Judith B. Tracy, “I See and I Remember; I Do and Understand”: Teaching Fundamental 
Structure in Legal Writing Through the Use of Samples, 21 TOURO L. REV. 297, 303-04 (2005).  Professor 
Tracy discussed the reasons behind viewing “objective analysis” as the foundation for analysis directed at 
persuading: 
[L]awyers first objectively analyze a client‟s legal situation before advising that client about an 
appropriate adversarial position and course of action.  Lawyers consider the client‟s facts in 
conjunction with a thorough and objective analysis of the relevant law . . . .  Only then can the 
lawyer assess the client‟s possible and practical options and provide advice.  The best choice, 
ranging from a vigorous adversarial pursuit of the matter to a recognition that immediate 
resolution would be best, will be determined by the objective analysis as applied to the facts, and 
this will dictate what advocacy documents the lawyer prepares. 
Id.  In addition, lawyers need to objectively analyze the relevant law and its implications as a foundation for 
sound and creative representation of clients in transactional situations.  Id. 
 28. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 29. See Posner, supra note 16, at 763 (noting that “a legal rule may be inchoate, intuited rather than 
articulated, and vaguely bounded, because the judge has to decide a case even if he is unsure what the rule 
governing it is and even if he is reluctant to declare a new rule”). 
 30. See Greenstein, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that the “principles that emerge from this process [of 
synthesizing cases] might or might not be thoroughly and accurately articulated in the instant opinion” 
(emphasis added)); Posner, supra note 16, at 764 (“judicial reasoning . . . expressed or implied in previous 
cases” (emphasis added)). 
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Whether based on ideas that are explicit, implicit, or both, a synthesis in 
an objective analysis must be consistent with the relevant group of mandatory 
cases from the jurisdiction, especially those decided by the highest appeals 
court.
31
  Under the doctrine of stare decisis, lawyers must presume that these 
cases form a rational approach to an area of law, even if some aspects are only 
inferentially supported.
32
  In contrast, one must discard a synthesis when it does 
not adequately take into account all relevant cases existing at that time, because 
such a synthesis would be a deficient articulation of the current status of the law 
in that jurisdiction.
33
 
Adequate synthesis in this context, therefore, requires a lawyer to follow a 
sophisticated methodology that takes careful account of a jurisdiction‟s case 
law.
34
  Under this methodology, a lawyer should work with the courts‟ explicit 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 42; Greenstein, supra note 1, at 7.  Determining 
which cases are “relevant” to the specific focus of a lawyer‟s analysis involves a series of analytical skills; 
however, a discussion of these skills is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 32. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 51.  In his lectures, Professor Llewellyn focused on synthesizing 
cases from different jurisdictions (as students do in doctrinal courses focused on particular subjects) but he 
never let students forget that they must still be sensitive to the constraints of jurisdictional boundaries when 
doing so.  Id.  Thus, he observed:  
[I]n your matching of cases, you may, as a last resort when unable to make the cases fit together, 
fall back upon the answer: here is a conflict; these cases represent two different points of view.  
You must, however, before you do that, make sure that they come from different jurisdictions, 
else one will have to be regarded as flatly overruling the other. 
Id. at 51-52. 
 33. Of course, a lawyer could encounter situations that are exceptions to the rule that a synthesis must 
take into account all relevant cases in the jurisdiction.  For instance, in rare situations a lawyer may encounter 
a completely anomalous decision that simply cannot be reconciled with the rest of the relevant cases from the 
jurisdiction.  Here, the lawyer would proceed through the same methodology of attempting to synthesize the 
explicit and implicit ideas from the group of relevant cases, but would ultimately recognize that a case‟s 
reasoning and decision on the facts before the court is not consistent with the rest of the cases in the group.  In 
this circumstance, then, the lawyer would decide that future courts in the jurisdiction would not be persuaded 
by the anomalous precedent and would consequently exclude the decision from the synthesis.  Of course, the 
lawyer must come to this conclusion with great care—evaluating the authority of the case, the date of the 
decision, and any other indications that the case is either foreshadowing a change in doctrine and reasoning of 
the courts or that there really are conflicting possible approaches developing in the jurisdiction. 
A second possible exception is when there is a conflict in approaches between intermediate appeals 
courts of the same jurisdiction on an issue not yet addressed by the highest appeals court. Here, a synthesis 
would be different: it would need to include both approaches, and the lawyer would need to evaluate which 
approach, if either, appeared more consistent with ideas of the highest appeals court‟s relevant decisions. 
A third possible exception is when the courts state that they are applying a certain approach in a group 
of decisions, yet the facts and results of some or all of the cases contradict the courts‟ assertions.  In this kind 
of situation, then, a lawyer must synthesize the cases by explaining what the courts are doing, even if 
contradictory to ideas expressed explicitly on the pages of some or all of the decisions. 
 34. The process of synthesizing cases from one jurisdiction with persuasive cases from another 
jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, in an objective analysis of the law, lawyers may 
sometimes find it beneficial to synthesize these two types of cases together.  Incorporating ideas from 
persuasive cases adds needed support, for instance, when an analysis of a group of cases from the lawyer‟s 
own jurisdiction is based on inferential reasoning, see infra Part III.C.3, and these ideas have been explicitly 
articulated by courts from other jurisdictions.  In this situation, lawyers may choose to include persuasive 
cases, depending upon their usefulness.  If a persuasive case is incorporated, though, the same overall 
methodology to synthesize the group of cases should be followed.  Thus, ideas in the overall explanation of the 
synthesis of the jurisdiction‟s cases must still reasonably test back on the facts and results, as well as the 
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reasoning as well as with ideas that have not been directly expressed by the 
courts but that may be carefully inferred by evaluating the facts, decisions, and 
explicit reasoning of the entire group of relevant cases.
35
  Both of these steps 
are described further in Part III.B.2-3, although working with any particular 
group of cases may not necessarily follow such a linear progression as 
illustrated by the application of this process to the hypothetical problem in Part 
IV.
36
 
2.  Beginning the Process of Synthesis: Working with the Courts’ Explicitly 
Expressed Ideas 
Lawyers begin the process of synthesizing ideas from a group of cases by 
working with the courts‟ explicit statements about the area of law.  If the courts 
say they are using certain principles, lawyers should begin their analysis with 
this foundation of ideas.
37
  Judges do, of course, tend to express some ideas 
unambiguously and explicitly as they reason to a decision for the parties before 
the court.
38
  These ideas then join with the explicit ideas from the other relevant 
cases to articulate, at least to some degree, that jurisdiction‟s approach to an 
area of law—its general analytical framework and some or all of its components 
and their interrelationships.
39
 In synthesizing these explicitly articulated ideas, 
lawyers may encounter several situations, each of which requires a somewhat 
different methodology.
40
 
                                                                                                                 
explicit reasoning of the persuasive cases, and vice versa.  Only in this way do the persuasive cases adequately 
support a lawyer‟s synthesis of his own jurisdiction‟s case law. 
 35. The Legal Reasoning, Research & Writing faculty at Boston College Law School teach the 
methodology described in this section to all first-year students as part of a curriculum on foundational 
analytical skills.  See generally Judith B. Tracy, Constructing an Analytical Framework that Captures and 
Verifies Implicit Reasoning, 14 SECOND DRAFT: BULL. OF THE LEGAL WRITING INST., May 2000, at 6-7, 
available at http://www.lwionline.org/publications/seconddraft/may00.pdf (outlining a method of teaching 
students how to analyze and synthesize cases). 
 36. See infra Part III.B.2-3, IV. 
 37. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 579-80 (1987).  In his in-depth analysis of the 
role of precedent in our judicial system, Professor Schauer noted that there is an 
important distinction between decisions containing and those not containing canonical language.  
At times a decision will be accompanied by an articulated and authoritative characterization of the 
decision and its underlying facts.  This articulated characterization . . . constrains the use of 
subsequent and inconsistent characterizations. . . . [T]hat language cannot absolutely prevent a 
subsequent interpreter from recharacterizing the first case.  But that interpreter must at least 
confront an argumentative burden not present without an articulated characterization. 
Id.; see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 36 (“[T]he court in its opinion has laid down a rule, or five.  
These, too, have been pronounced, as things we are to reckon with.  We shall do well to heed them.”). 
 38. OATES & ENQUIST, supra note 9, at 222. 
 39. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 41-49. 
 40. See id. at 44-45 (discussing “textual fusion,” and dividing it into the four inquiries of “material that 
is identical in all rules, material that is similar in all rules, material that appears in only some rules, or material 
that differs from rule to rule”); see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 39-48 (discussing a method to 
synthesize rules that have already been articulated in a group of cases).  
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In some instances, several cases not only explicitly articulate a central idea 
but also describe this idea using the same words or phrasing.
41
  Synthesis in this 
situation simply requires recognizing the thematic use of the same idea 
expressed in the same way in two or more cases.
42
  Reading the cases, the 
lawyer compares and contrasts words and phrasing, examines how the words 
and phrasing are used in each case, and decides whether the courts are using the 
words and phrasing in a consistent manner.
43
 
In other situations, the courts will articulate the same idea but will use 
different words to express it.
44
  On the one hand, it is seemingly irrational for 
courts from the same jurisdiction, given the doctrine of stare decisis, not to 
express the same idea in the same words.
45
  On the other hand, because case 
law develops over a period of time and decisions by the same court may 
actually be decisions of entirely different groups of judges, it is understandable 
that different courts, even in the same jurisdiction, might use different words to 
explain the same idea.
46
  This situation is especially likely to occur when the 
courts are struggling to articulate a difficult idea and try different formulations 
in different cases over time until they decide on the best phrasing to 
communicate a particular concept.
47
 
When the courts appear to be using different words to express the same 
idea, a lawyer needs to identify those words that seem to express the same idea 
and compare their meaning carefully.
48
  The lawyer must then test back the 
word or phrasing within the analytical framework of each individual case in the 
relevant group to be sure that each of the courts are, or reasonably appear to be, 
using the term in the same manner.
49
  The doctrine of stare decisis requires an 
initial presumption that the use of similar words is an attempt to express the 
same idea, or that the words fit together in some other rational way to develop 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See OATES & ENQUIST, supra note 9, at 222 ( “Make sure you understand the law.  For some areas 
of law, this part of the process is easy: the courts have set out, clearly and concisely, the rules that they apply 
in determining whether a particular element is met, and the courts apply those rules consistently.”); 
SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 44 (discussing when a group of decisions includes “material that 
is identical in all rules”). 
 42. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 44-45. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. (discussing the situation when a group of cases includes “material that is similar in all 
rules”). 
 45. See id. at 25-26, 44. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-9 (1949).  Professor Levi 
described the time period when courts are working out a concept in the law over several cases as follows: 
The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are compared.  The 
period is one in which the court fumbles for a phrase.  Several phrases may be tried out; the 
misuse or misunderstanding of words itself may have an effect.  The concept sounds like another, 
and the jump to the second is made. 
Id. 
 48. See ROBIN WELLFORD SLOCUM, LEGAL REASONING, WRITING, AND PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT 155-
56 (2d ed. 2006). 
 49. See id.; see also SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 44-45. 
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an aspect of the law at issue in that jurisdiction.
50
  When synthesizing explicit 
ideas in this manner, for instance, a lawyer must distinguish between the 
situation when the courts are expressing the same idea in two different ways 
and the situation when the courts are using a specific phrase to explain a more 
general concept and are thus describing two different pieces of the analysis.
51
 
If all cases in the group include explicit language that the lawyer 
determines is consistent in content and phrasing, or is consistent in content even 
though not in phrasing, then the process ends.
52
  However, if some cases do not 
contain the explicit language at all, then the lawyer must test back the 
synthesized language on these cases‟ facts, results, and relevant explicit 
reasoning to be sure all cases reasonably support the synthesis.
53
 
Still another scenario may occur when the courts explicitly articulate many 
key ideas but clarify different points in different cases within the group.
54
  
Judges cannot choose the cases that come before them but instead must wait 
until specific factual situations randomly arrive at their doorstep.
55
  For this 
reason, courts in a particular jurisdiction tend to “worry at” an area of law and 
add different pieces to the overall puzzle of the analysis over time,
56
 but do not 
necessarily develop the law holistically enough to provide sufficient guidance 
to lawyers.
57
 
In this situation, a lawyer must discover each important idea by reading 
through the cases and picking out significant pieces of the overall analytical 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See generally BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004) (providing a basic definition and 
discussion of stare decisis). 
 51. See SLOCUM, supra note 48, at 159. 
 52. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 44-45. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. (discussing “[t]extual fusion”—a synthesis of explicit ideas “appearing in only some cases”); 
see also ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 13, at 22 (stating that in some circumstances courts may “articulate 
a piece of a rule, and other opinions [in the jurisdiction] are needed to complete the legal thought”). 
 55. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 44-45.  Because appellate courts must wait until 
important legal issues arrive at their doorstep to make a decision, many jurisdictions have special procedures 
whereby the highest appeals court may expedite a case‟s appeal process directly to the highest court.  See, e.g., 
MASS. R. APP. P. 11(f) (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court‟s direct appellate review process). 
 56. I am indebted to my colleague at Boston College Law School, Dan Barnett, for coming up with this 
vivid image.  With his students, he elaborates on this jigsaw puzzle analogy to illustrate that different 
individuals have different processes to determine the overall analytical structure to a legal problem.  “Some 
people begin at the edges and finish all of that part of the puzzle before proceeding to begin work on the 
middle of the picture,” he says.  “Some people begin in the middle of the puzzle and only work on the edges 
toward the end of the process.  And some people work back and forth from edges to middle and from middle 
to edges until the whole picture is complete.”  I have found that this illustration is a compelling way to explain 
to students the process of developing the analytical structure of any legal problem because it makes it clear 
that different individuals may reasonably follow a different sequence of analytical skills and reach equally 
valid results. 
 57. See ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 13, at 22.  At certain points in the development of a body of 
law in a jurisdiction, the courts fully articulate their doctrine, including the policy rationales that support that 
doctrine.  See id.  Such a decision will be significant for a lawyer when analyzing that area of law because it 
will develop and articulate the courts‟ approach, even though each new factual situation that comes before the 
courts will test out the parameters of that doctrine and reasoning.  See id.  Additionally, each new case begins 
to further develop and refine the courts‟ articulated approach, and the process begins all over again.  See id. 
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framework, which will be explicit in some cases, but not in all.
58
  The lawyer 
must then decide how to fit the pieces together into a coherent description of 
the courts‟ overall approach, even though no single case sets it out 
holistically.
59
  This description, however, must then test back as consistent with 
all cases in the entire group,
60
 both as to what the courts explicitly say they are 
doing and why, and inferentially as to explaining each court‟s outcome on the 
facts before it.
61
 
3.  Continuing the Process of Synthesis: Working with Ideas That Are 
Completely Implicit in a Group of Cases 
In many circumstances, lawyers must look beyond the courts‟ explicit 
ideas and consider ideas that are not yet articulated in any of the relevant cases 
and therefore completely implicit.
62
  This step is necessary to uncover important 
ideas in the analysis that the courts have not yet discussed but were arguably 
implicitly using to reach their decisions.
63
  For instance, a lawyer might need to 
determine the courts‟ underlying policy concerns, or a necessary piece of the 
courts‟ doctrine.64 
To work with ideas in an objective analysis, lawyers must follow a careful 
methodology to ensure that their inferences are reasonably supported by 
relevant cases in the jurisdiction and therefore fall within a “reasonable zone of 
right explanations” of the courts‟ implicit meaning.65  To begin the process, 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. 
 59. VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 39-44 (discussing different possible relationships between rules). 
 60. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 44-45 (discussing the situation when the lawyer is 
dealing with “material appearing in only some cases” and noting that the lawyer must test whether this 
material explains the whole group of cases); Kevin H. Smith, Practical Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and 
Synthesizing the Art and Science of Thinking like a Lawyer, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 40, 46 (1998) (stating that 
“[s]ynthesis involves . . . the creation of general propositions from the results of specific cases” and 
illustrating this process with an examination of a series of hypothetical cases). 
 61. Cf.  supra note 33 (discussing exceptions to this statement). 
 62. The common usage definition of “implicit” is consistent with its meaning in terms of synthesizing 
cases: “capable of being understood from something else though unexpressed.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER‟S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 624. 
 63. SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 47 (noting that looking “for patterns in the cases‟ facts, 
results, and reasonings, including policies” is important when there are “hidden rules” because “the court has 
not articulated the rule fully or clearly”); VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 48 (observing that “[s]ituations arise 
in which the lawyer wishes to establish the existence of a rule not previously recognized in explicit terms”); 
Smith, supra note 60, at 40 (stating that “[synthesis] is imperative when there is more than one case dealing 
with a particular legal issue, and the courts have not stated any general legal rule that governed their 
disposition of the cases”). 
 64. See SCHMEDEMANN & KUNZ, supra note 13, at 47. 
 65. See Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 432-33.  A lawyer‟s analysis must fall within a reasonable zone of 
right answers to be useful.  Id.  “The law practitioner depends on writing whose ideas are accurate because 
they fall within a range of analysis—even if creative or novel—that „reasonably‟ interprets relevant, 
controlling legal authority, and „reasonably‟ argues how that interpretation affects the client‟s problem.  Ideas 
outside this „reasonable zone‟ are incorrect.”  Id.; see also SLOCUM, supra note 48, at 157 (describing case 
synthesis as combining common elements in cases and bringing them together as a broad rule that accurately 
depicts the cases as a whole). 
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lawyers must evaluate the significance of each case in relationship to all other 
cases in the group and then hypothesize possible explanations of the court‟s 
implicit meaning.
66
  Depending on the particular group of cases, more than one 
explanation might reasonably be inferred from the cases.
67
 
Any explanation must then test back on all cases in the group or relevant 
subgroup.
68
  While an explanation does not need to have been articulated by 
any one court within the group,
69
 it must make logical sense in relationship to 
the facts and results of each individual case and its explicitly articulated 
doctrine and reasoning, especially when those cases are decided by the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Groups of cases may fall into two distinct patterns, and this result affects how lawyers must analyze 
the cases.  On the one hand, a lawyer may encounter a group of cases in a jurisdiction where each court made 
a fact-specific decision but failed to articulate all aspects of the courts‟ doctrine and reasoning.  In this 
situation, a lawyer must synthesize the cases as a group to determine the courts‟ approach because each case 
only adds nuances to the overall analysis and does not provide a complete picture.  Here, the law is not 
necessarily evolving from one approach to another; the courts simply are not fully articulating their approach, 
and the lawyer must make inferences from the group of cases to determine the courts‟ approach.  On the other 
hand, a lawyer may encounter the situation in which the courts have decided cases in an evolutionary fashion 
by developing the law over time in a series of decisions and then finally coming to a conclusion, which might 
be radically different from where they began.  In this circumstance, once the final case has been decided, 
much of the doctrine and reasoning is articulated for a lawyer, although the common law process begins again 
with each new case.  See Greenstein, supra note 1, at 11-13 (illustrating a lawyer‟s synthesis of case law by 
comparing a group of New York criminal law cases with the famous series of New York products liability 
cases, which ends with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), to illustrate the court‟s 
evolutionary approach). 
 67. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 50 (observing that synthesizing cases “is not mechanical” and “is 
a process that . . . can lead to more than one result”). 
 68. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 50.  In discussing how students should synthesize cases in a 
doctrinal class when “all the cases everywhere can stand together,” Professor Llewellyn‟s words mirrored the 
general process of hypothesizing and testing back as a lawyer would do with cases from one particular 
jurisdiction.  See id. 
[T]o test the rule laid down in either case, as also to test our tentative formulation which we have 
built to cover both, we do two things.  First and easiest is to play variations on the facts, making 
the case gradually more and more extreme until we find the place beyond which it does not seem 
sense to go. . . .  We may find the stopping-place much sooner than we had expected, and thus be 
forced to recast and narrow the generalization we have made, or to recast it even on wholly 
different lines.  The second and more difficult way of testing is to go to the books and find further 
cases in which variations on the facts occur, and in which the importance of such variations has 
been put to the proof.  The first way is the intuitional correction of hypothesis; the second way is 
the experimental test of whether an hypothesis is sound.  Both are needed.  The first, to save time. 
The second, to make sure. 
Id.; cf. Peter W. Gross, On Law School Training in Analytic Skill, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 288 (1973) 
(describing how to synthesize material).  Professor Gross does not use “hypothesis and test back” in specific 
relationship to synthesizing the implicit reasoning in a group of cases in a particular jurisdiction, but he does 
use it in a more general way to describe how a law student should work with the content from material 
included in the student‟s Research Notes, developed during the research process, to come up with the 
applicable law: 
At some point . . . [the student] hypothesizes a rule of law which (i) answers a question posed in 
the Work Notes [which should include the projected research strategy based on a preliminary 
analysis of the legal problem] and (ii) seems consistent with the research materials, as reflected in 
the Research Notes.  The student then tests his hypothesis against the research materials.  This 
hypothesis-test sequence is functionally similar to inquiry in empirical science . . . . 
Peter W. Gross, On Law School Training in Analytic Skill, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 288 (1973). 
 69. See Smith, supra note 60, at 40. 
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jurisdiction‟s highest appeals court.70  In general, if any authoritative case in the 
jurisdiction contradicts the explanation of the courts‟ implicit meaning, then the 
lawyer must go back to the drawing board and refine the hypothesis.  In 
addition, even if an explanation is not inconsistent with any of the cases, it must 
still test back on a sufficient foundation of facts in the decisions; otherwise, the 
cases do not provide adequate support for the explanation.
71
 
Using this methodology, the lawyer is able to distinguish between an 
explanation that is reasonably supported by the cases in the jurisdiction, even 
though implicit, and an explanation that is outside the reasonable zone and 
must be discarded.
72
  Thus, the lawyer ensures that the inferred ideas are 
consistent with all relevant precedent and, therefore, in harmony with the 
concept of stare decisis.
73
  This result is true even though an individual case 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 71-72.  When describing this process of hypothesizing and 
testing back on the facts, decisions, and reasoning of the case, Professor Llewellyn stated: 
[I]t becomes clear that whereas the deductive aspects of your application of a rule once made may 
be, ideally, perfectly certain, your induction, which precedes, is one which begins not with 
definite, but with indefinite material: one therefore into which elements of judgment, hunches, 
prediction enter as you freeze it into definite arbitrary form to make possible its logical 
manipulation; and it is clear that in choosing the definite form you give it, you must be guided by 
the desire that your conclusion may work out in fact, in life.  You must therefore cut the raw 
material of your single cases according to your expectation about how courts will handle each one 
of them as precedent. 
Id.; see also ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 13, at 40 (stating that the synthesis “must be germane to the 
reasoning and holdings of the precedents”); VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 50-53 (stating that the lawyer must 
use careful judgment about the level of generality of a synthesis inferred from a group of cases and about the 
synthesis‟s consistency with the courts‟ explicitly articulated policy concerns); Greenstein, supra note 1, at 5 
(observing that, within a discussion of the process of synthesizing a group of cases in a particular jurisdiction, 
“it can be said that while there may be no single synthesis that all lawyers would agree is correct, there will be 
many syntheses that are clearly wrong”). 
 71. Smith, supra note 60, at 43 (noting that “[a] limitation of inductive reasoning [when synthesizing 
cases] is that the generalizations which can be drawn from the specific facts are bounded by the specific 
facts”). 
 72. Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 432-33; see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 71-72.  The author 
believes that “hypothesizing and testing back” is a more useful way to describe the process of working with 
implicit ideas in a group of cases than the more prevalent phrase of “deductive and inductive reasoning.”  It is 
true, of course, that synthesizing a group of cases does require both deductive and inductive reasoning.  For 
instance, hypothesizing an explanation from the facts and results of a group of cases requires inductive 
reasoning—inducing from the specific facts and results of a group of cases and coming up with a possible 
general explanation or explanations.  Testing this hypothesis back, then, is deductive reasoning—deducing 
whether the synthesized explanation does, in fact, explain the facts and results of all relevant cases and is 
consistent with any relevant explicit ideas in the cases.  While this hypothesis and testing back model can be 
accurately explained in terms of deductive and inductive reasoning, the author believes that such a complex 
process is not made any easier by adding additional labels to the steps that need to be taken.  Simply 
describing the process in a straightforward manner by using the steps of the process, as the Article does, is 
much more effective.  But see, e.g., VANDEVELDE, supra note 7 (discussing deductive and inductive 
reasoning); Hunter, supra note 1, at 380-91 (analyzing inductive reasoning when working with case law); 
Anita Schnee, Logical Reasoning “Obviously,” 3 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 105 (1997) 
(analyzing the relationship between inductive and deductive legal reasoning). 
 73. See Hunter, supra note 1, at 380-91, 400.  This process of hypothesizing and then testing back an 
explanation on the group of cases addresses a concern of Professor Hunter that inductive reasoning is not 
sound if based on incomplete or incorrect empirical evidence.  See id.  Professor Hunter raises this issue 
because he fails to adequately distinguish between inductive reasoning when there is insufficient concrete 
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may eventually stand for ideas that were never articulated by an authoring judge 
and that may even transcend the judge‟s actual reasoning in coming to the 
decision.
74
 
C.  Synthesizing Cases in Different Contexts: Objective Analysis Versus 
Argument 
Synthesizing ideas is different when a lawyer is working with a group of 
cases to make an objective analysis of the current status of the law, as opposed 
to when a lawyer is generating arguments on behalf of a client or anticipating 
arguments from the opponent.
75
  In an objective analysis, the reasonable zone 
may include more than one explanation,
76
 but all of the explanations should be 
reasonably supported by the current body of case law, even if the lawyer has 
moved into inferential reasoning.  Thus, as described above, these explanations 
should strictly test back on the cases in the sense of being consistent with each 
case‟s relevant facts, results, and explicit reasoning.77  Only then will an 
explanation accurately describe the current status of the jurisdiction‟s law, 
which is the goal of an objective analysis.
78
 
Explanations that strictly test back in this manner also serve as an 
excellent foundation for arguments to persuade a court to view a jurisdiction‟s 
case law in a particular way.
79
 An argument with this type of foundation, even 
                                                                                                                 
evidence to back up the hypothesis and the inductive reasoning that lawyers do.  See id.  In the context of 
synthesizing implicit ideas from a group of precedent cases from one particular jurisdiction, the evidence 
includes the facts, decisions, and explicit reasoning of all relevant cases.  While in many circumstances this 
process may allow more than one explanation to fall within the reasonable zone, it does differentiate between 
explanations that are reasonable and those that are not.  Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 432-33; see also supra 
note 72 and accompanying text. 
 74. See LEVI, supra note 47, at 2-3 (observing that “[i]t is not what the prior judge intended that is of 
any importance; rather it is what the present judge, attempting to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, 
thinks should be the determining classification”); Dworkin, supra note 13, at 542 (stating that when “the 
argument turns on which rules or principles of law „underlie‟ the related decisions of other judges in the past,” 
each judge “must read through what other judges in the past have written not simply to discover what these 
judges have said, or their state of mind when they said it, but to reach an opinion about what these judges 
have collectively done”). 
Any law school professor who has constructed a problem for students that includes the underlying legal 
authority will have had an experience analogous to that of a judge writing words in a judicial opinion that take 
on a life beyond the judge‟s meaning when lawyers begin to synthesize the cases as a group.  In my own 
experience of working with four cases that I had constructed as a hypothetical problem for my students, I 
added one word to one of the four cases merely to make the case read more smoothly.  In fact, I did not intend 
to change the meaning of that case or what the four cases together indicated.  In practice, however, that one 
word, when analyzed in conjunction with the other three cases, created a second legal issue for my students.  I 
resisted my students‟ repeated attempts to introduce this new piece of analysis because I certainly had not 
intended it as the author of the cases, but in the end my students were correct.  That one word, given the four 
cases as a group, had changed the analysis in ways I, as the author, had not anticipated. 
 75. See generally VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 53-55. 
 76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra Part III.B.2-3. 
 78. See supra Part III.A. 
 79. In addition, lawyers may also need to convince others, such as opposing counsel, of the validity of 
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when based on inferential reasoning, is likely to make a court feel comfortable 
in following an argument‟s point of view because that point of view is based on 
a reasonable interpretation of prior case law.
80
 
In contrast, when lawyers craft arguments that push the parameters of the 
current case law, testing back explanations may take on a somewhat more 
expansive role that results in a broader reasonable zone of right explanations.  
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, arguments in these circumstances need to 
generally consider the current body of precedent but do not necessarily need to 
test back on the cases in the same strict manner required in an objective 
analysis. 
For instance, an argument might suggest the next step to the courts‟ 
current approach but have no specific foundation in the relevant cases.  The 
courts might not have explicitly discussed such a next step, perhaps because no 
prior case was based on facts that raised the issue.  This type of argument, 
therefore, could not technically test back as strictly as an objective analysis 
because it would not test back on any specific explicit reasoning or even any 
facts that any court relied on to reach its decision.  However, this argument 
could still reasonably test back on the group of cases if this next step were 
consistent with the courts‟ general policy concerns in that area of law.81 
In another situation, a lawyer might argue that the courts‟ current approach 
should be rejected and another adopted, given shifting norms in society or other 
cogent rationales for overturning established doctrine and overruling long-term 
precedent.
82
 This kind of argument also does not technically test back on the 
cases as written, although it does reasonably take prior precedent into 
consideration. 
 
                                                                                                                 
their analysis or the likelihood that the client, on the basis of that analysis, will prevail before a court. 
 80. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 53 (“[When making an argument to a court,] the lawyer 
attempting to create the [new] rule . . . wants to generalize from as many cases as possible . . . .  The more 
cases that have recognized the rule, the more the rule looks like a well-established rule of law that the court 
must apply and the less the court feels that it has ventured onto new terrain.”); Paul T. Wangerin, A 
Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Structure of Persuasive Arguments, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‟Y 195, 216-
17 (1993) [hereinafter Wangerin, A Multidisciplinary Approach] (“[R]ules [based on a synthesis of a group of 
cases] are accompanied, almost by definition, by more „backing‟ than are [individual] cases.  Because of that 
fact, the results brought about by the application of rules to a new set of facts tend to be viewed as more 
credible than results brought about by extrapolating the result in a single past case to a present problem.”). 
 81. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 82 (noting that a “technique for arguing that a rule applies to a 
case is to demonstrate that the policies underlying the rule would also be furthered by applying the rule to the 
current case”); Wangerin, A Multidisciplinary Analysis, supra note 80, at 219 (discussing how an advocate 
might use “policy-based reasoning to contradict the results seemingly called for by case-based [comparison of 
precedent to the situation before the court] and rule-based [synthesis of ideas from a group of cases] 
reasoning”). 
 82. See CARDOZO, supra note 10, at 136-37.  Justice Cardozo discussed this situation from a judge‟s 
point of view: “Insignificant is the power of innovation of any judge, when compared with the bulk and 
pressure of the rules that hedge him on every side.  Innovate, however, to some extent, he must, for with new 
conditions there must be new rules. . . . [W]ithin this narrow range of choice he shall search for social 
justice.”  Id. 
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IV.  SYNTHESIZING CASES ILLUSTRATED: METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO 
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM 
A.  Introduction 
The discussion below illustrates the process of synthesizing a group of 
cases, including all of its component sub-skills. The illustration uses a relatively 
simple problem based on hypothetical law relevant to a legal issue of when toys 
are dangerous for young children.  This problem was chosen as a vehicle to 
highlight the methodology and not to explore underlying substantive aspects of 
tort law or to accurately describe an actual jurisdiction‟s approach to products 
liability law.
83
  (Important note to the reader: You should consider actively 
working through, instead of merely passively reading, the discussion that 
follows.) 
B.  Client’s Situation, Relevant Law, and Initial Analysis 
Imagine that the research and development department of a toy 
manufacturing company has designed a toy truck that they intend to market to 
young children. This truck is to be made out of heavy, soft rubber and 
constructed so that it would have a rounded cab section and an open truck bed 
that would be square in shape.  The company has asked their lawyer for advice 
on whether the toy‟s design might raise any liability issues concerning safety 
for young children. 
As an initial step, the lawyer examines the law of the relevant jurisdiction. 
 The legislature has not addressed this issue, but the jurisdiction‟s highest 
appeals court has decided seven cases concerning toy safety and whether the 
toy before the court, if marketed for young children, would be dangerous. 
In the first case, the Frisbee case, the court found that a Frisbee made out 
of soft, lightweight plastic was not dangerous.  The court reasoned:  
The attributes of the material a toy is made of are among the primary 
motivating factors in our decisions on the dangerousness of the object. This 
factor obviously affects whether a product would tend to lacerate, knock 
unconscious, or otherwise seriously injure young children if the object 
encountered their bodies. 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See Smith, supra note 60, at 40-46 (using a hypothetical problem to illustrate the process of 
synthesizing fact-specific holdings to create rules); see also Charles R. Calleros, Using Classroom 
Demonstrations in Familiar Nonlegal Contexts to Introduce New Students to Unfamiliar Concepts of Legal 
Method and Analysis, 7 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 37, 42 (2001) (using everyday situations to 
illustrate analytical skills); Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 VA. L. REV. 915, 928-29 (1988); cf. Greenstein, 
supra note 1, at 2-7 (using a group of actual New York cases interpreting a statute to illustrate the process of 
synthesizing cases from a particular jurisdiction). 
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In the second case, the Beanie Baby case, the court concluded that a 
Beanie Baby stuffed animal was not dangerous, citing the Frisbee case.  The 
court stated that “we begin our analysis by assessing what the object is made 
from.” 
In the third case, the Toy Sword case, the court decided that a toy sword, 
described as a “toy sword made of lightweight, firm rubber with a rounded 
handle and sword tip” was not dangerous.  The court reasoned that “the fact 
that the toy is made with this material helps prevent, among other things, the 
object from harming young children,” and cited the Frisbee case and the Beanie 
Baby case. 
In the fourth case, the Baseball Bat case, the court found “a heavy, rigid 
metal baseball bat” was a “dangerous object, if marketed for young children 
who might be injured by an object with such a composition.”  Again, the court 
cited all prior cases. 
In the fifth case, the Nesting Boxes case, the court came to the conclusion 
that “boxes that nested inside each other were dangerous.”  “Even though these 
boxes have an acceptable composition of lightweight, rigid plastic,” the court 
reasoned, “the angled corners create a toy that might injure young children.”  
The court cited all prior cases as support. 
In the sixth case, the Ball case, the court determined that “a ball of 
lightweight, hard metal” was not dangerous, reasoning that “metal is not always 
a dangerous material for toys for young children.” The court specifically 
distinguished the Baseball Bat case and cited the Frisbee case, the Beanie Baby 
case, and the Toy Sword case as supporting authority. 
In the seventh case, the Blocks case, the court held that the toy before the 
court was not dangerous.  Beyond describing the toy as “oval blocks made out 
of soft cloth and filled with a heavy mixture of beans,” the court did not further 
develop its reasoning, although it cited the Frisbee case and the Ball case. 
After analyzing each of the seven cases individually,
84
 the lawyer 
concludes that none of them are directly on point with the truck proposed by the 
client, and, therefore, that no individual case answers the question of whether a 
future court would view the truck as dangerous.  To advise the client, the 
lawyer must synthesize the relevant ideas in the entire group of cases to 
determine the courts‟ approach in this area of law in this jurisdiction.85 The 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  When deciding which case to analyze first, the lawyer 
would have a choice.  He might begin with the case decided first and work forward because the first case 
might set out a foundation of ideas that later cases build on.  He might, instead, begin with the most recent 
case, the seventh case, because that case might provide the courts‟ latest, and possibly most developed, 
reasoning in this area of law in this jurisdiction, or demonstrate that the court had significantly changed its 
analysis in some manner.  However, because the cases in this jurisdiction do not follow an evolutionary 
progression in the sense that they build to a fairly well-articulated final analysis, the lawyer could begin with 
any case and work through them as a group.  This approach is the difference between synthesizing cases that 
are evolutionary and those that must be analyzed as a group because each case adds its own “piece” explicitly, 
and perhaps implicitly, to what the cases as a whole group will ultimately stand for.  See Greenstein, supra 
note 1, at 11-13; Wangerin, Skills Training, supra note 1, at 445; supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 85. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
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lawyer would begin by evaluating what the courts have explicitly articulated.
86
 
If these explicit ideas do not provide sufficient guidance, however, the lawyer 
would proceed to work with ideas inferentially supported by the seven cases.
87
 
C.  Beginning an Analysis of a Group of Cases: The Courts’ Explicit 
Reasoning 
1.  Introduction 
The courts in these seven cases have explicitly expressed a good deal of 
analysis on when toys for young children are dangerous.  These ideas, then, 
provide the foundation for the following conclusions about the courts‟ current 
approach: (1) that the courts use a factor concerning the composition of or the 
material that the toy is made from;
88
 (2) that they analyze this factor first;
89
 and 
(3) that they do so because of a policy concern about toys injuring young 
children.
90
 
2.  One Piece of Explicit Analysis: The Courts Use a Factor That Evaluates 
the Composition of or Material That a Toy Is Made of 
The lawyer recognizes that “material that a toy is made of” and 
“composition of” are two explicit phrases used in the cases and begins the 
analysis by hypothesizing that the courts were using these phrases 
interchangeably for the same idea.
91
  Four of the courts explicitly rely on the 
idea of “material that a toy is made of,” phrased in the same, or very similar, 
manner to reach a decision on whether the toy before the court was dangerous.  
The court in the Frisbee case clearly identified “the material a toy is made of” 
as a particular piece of its analysis—a factor.  Moreover, in the Beanie Baby 
case, the court stated that it assesses “what the object is made from.”  Further, 
the courts in the Toy Sword case and the Ball case each relied on this concept to 
reach their decisions and phrased it similarly.  In Toy Sword, the court stated 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See infra Part IV.C. 
 87. See infra Part IV.D. 
 88. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 89. See infra Part IV.C.3.  
 90.  See infra Part IV.C.4. 
 91. Any description of an analytical process must begin somewhere and must be set forth in a fairly 
linear fashion.  However, any particular lawyer‟s actual process of choosing where to begin the analysis with a 
particular group of cases might be different for a range of reasons, including what the lawyer encounters in the 
particular analysis and the lawyer‟s own personal style of proceeding through the necessary steps of the 
analysis.  Here, in this dangerous toy analysis of the seven cases in this jurisdiction, the lawyer might have 
begun, as described above, with the courts‟ language—“composition” and “material of.”  However, the lawyer 
might have also begun with the courts‟ articulated policy concerns.  Beginning at either point would have 
resulted in the same analysis.  See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (discussing how a lawyer 
synthesizes explicit reasoning when courts use inconsistent phrasing for the same idea). 
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the “toy is made with this material,” and the court in the Ball case stated “metal 
is not always a dangerous material for toys for young children.” 
In comparing the phrase “material that a toy is made of” to the explicit use 
of the word “composition” in the Baseball Bat case and the Nesting Boxes case, 
the lawyer feels fairly sure that the same ideas were used consistently, despite 
the change in terms.  For instance, in the Baseball Bat case, the phrase “an 
object with such a composition” appears to refer to the fact that the baseball bat 
was made from heavy metal.  The court clearly relied on this idea when making 
its decision that the toy was dangerous for young children.  In the Nesting 
Boxes case, the court connected what the nesting boxes were made out of to the 
term “composition” by using the phrase “composition of lightweight, rigid 
plastic.”  Holding that this factor was acceptable, the court proceeded to find 
the toy dangerous on other grounds. 
Having worked through these steps, the lawyer concludes that six of the 
seven cases reasonably support a hypothesis that the courts use a factor that 
evaluates the material that the toy is made of, even though two of the courts 
describe this concept as “composition.”  This hypothesis also tests back on the 
final case, the Blocks case, even though that court, unlike the other six, did not 
explicitly articulate a focus on material or composition.
92
  In the Blocks case, 
the court did not explain why it found the blocks not dangerous.  However, the 
court described the toy as “blocks made out of soft cloth and filled with a heavy 
mixture of beans,” and this description supports a reasonable inference that the 
court was focusing on the blocks‟ material in making its decision that the toy 
was not dangerous.  This inference is further strengthened by the fact that the 
court cited the Frisbee case and the Ball case—both cases in which the courts 
explicitly addressed the toys‟ material. 
3.  A Second Piece of Explicit Analysis: The Courts Analyze This Factor 
First 
As a possible next step, the lawyer hypothesizes that the courts first look 
to the factor of the toy‟s material or composition in their analyses of whether a 
toy is dangerous and bases this hypothesis on the explicit reasoning in the 
Frisbee case and the Beanie Baby case. In the Beanie Baby case, the court 
stated that “we begin our analysis by assessing what the object is made from.”  
This idea is then supported by the explicit reasoning in the Frisbee case that 
“[t]he attributes of the material a toy is made of are among the primary 
motivating factors in our decisions on the dangerousness of the object.” 
Even though none of the other five decisions explicitly articulate that they 
start at this point, these cases implicitly support this hypothesis because they 
each begin their analysis by evaluating the “material that a toy is made of” or its 
“composition.”  The Toy Sword, Baseball Bat, and Ball cases explicitly do so 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. 
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by referring to the factor of material or composition, and the Blocks case 
implicitly does so in the way the court focuses on the facts when making its 
decision.  In the Nesting Boxes case, the court first concluded that the 
composition of the nesting boxes was satisfactory by using the word 
“acceptable,” and then it went on to find the toy dangerous on another ground. 
 Thus, the lawyer concludes that the hypothesis that the courts begin their 
analysis with this factor does test back on the explicit ideas, facts, and decisions 
of the entire group of seven cases. 
4.  A Third Piece of Explicit Analysis: The Courts’ Policy Concerns Behind 
Using the Factor of Material or Composition 
To proceed, the lawyer works with another explicit theme in the cases—
the courts‟ policy concerns behind why the factor of material or composition is 
important when evaluating a toy‟s dangerousness.  In fact, the lawyer might 
have decided to begin with this piece of analysis because it explains why the 
courts chose this factor in the first place.
93
 
The court in the Frisbee case explicitly set out its policy concern about 
injuries to young children and linked it directly to the “material the toy is made 
of”—an idea that all subsequent cases appear to adopt: “This factor obviously 
affects whether a product would tend to lacerate, knock unconscious, or 
otherwise seriously injure young children if the object encountered their 
bodies.”  Several of the other cases explicitly rearticulate this idea in some 
form, as seen in the Toy Sword case (“that the toy is made with this material 
helps prevent . . . the object from harming young children”); the Baseball Bat 
case (“young children . . . might be injured by an object with such a 
composition”); and the Nesting Boxes case (“toy that might injure young 
children”).  Several cases support this idea implicitly, as in the Beanie Baby, 
Ball, and Blocks cases, in which the facts and decisions of the courts are 
consistent with this rationale, especially given their citation to the Frisbee case. 
 Thus, all of the cases either explicitly or implicitly relied on these policy 
concerns when deciding whether the toy before the court satisfies the factor of 
material or composition and therefore is not dangerous for young children. 
D.  Moving to Ideas That Are Completely Implicit in a Group of Cases 
1.  Introduction 
After working with the explicit reasoning of these seven cases, the lawyer 
would have reasonably concluded the following about the courts‟ approach to 
evaluating a toy‟s danger to young children: The courts consider a factor that 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See supra note 91 (discussing that a lawyer‟s particular analytical process with this dangerous toy 
problem might begin at a different point and yet still end up with the same result). 
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addresses the toy‟s material or composition; their analysis begins with this 
factor; and this factor is consistent with the courts‟ policy concerns about 
preventing injuries to young children. 
The analysis to this point, however, does not sufficiently explain why the 
courts find some toys‟ material or composition acceptable.  The cases 
themselves do not articulate this next level of more specific reasoning that is 
necessary to predict how a court would react to the client‟s proposed toy.  To 
successfully advise the client on the design of the toy truck, the lawyer will 
need to move beyond what the cases explicitly address and infer what the 
decisions implicitly support.
94
 
The lawyer needs to now use inferential reasoning to hypothesize an 
explanation (or explanations) for why the courts decided the way they did about 
the acceptability of the toys‟ material or composition. This explanation must 
test back on the facts, results, and any relevant explicit reasoning of all seven 
cases to fall within a reasonable zone of right explanations for the courts‟ 
current analysis in this jurisdiction.
95
  More than one explanation might be 
reasonable, but any explanation contradicted by some or all of the relevant 
cases would need to be discarded as insufficiently supported by the 
jurisdiction‟s law at this point in time.96 
Assuming that all seven cases are mandatory authority in this particular 
jurisdiction and must be accounted for, following this procedure is important.
97
 
Again, the lawyer should assume that the appellate courts had a rational set of 
reasons to make the distinctions they did about the dangerousness of the 
different toys—based on their material or composition, and potentially other 
factors—even if the court did not explicitly articulate these reasons.98 
2.  Developing an Explanation About the Specific Aspects of a Toy’s 
Material or Composition That Make It Acceptable  
a.  Charting out the Courts’ Decisions in Preparation for Hypothesizing a 
More Specific Explanation of What Satisfies This Factor 
To begin the next step in the analysis, the lawyer could chart out the cases 
in the following manner and then look for implicit themes to explain the 
specific aspects of a toy‟s material or composition that make it acceptable or 
unacceptable.  The lawyer must identify those toys that did not “tend to 
lacerate, knock unconscious, or otherwise seriously injure young children,” and 
that were therefore not dangerous, as well as those toys about which the courts 
reached the opposite conclusion. 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 95. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 96. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 97. This is true except in unusual circumstances.  See supra note 33. 
 98. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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Chart 1 
Material or Composition Determination Case Name 
Plastic Acceptable Frisbee 
Cloth and stuffing Acceptable Beanie Baby 
Rubber Acceptable Toy Sword 
Plastic Acceptable Nesting Boxes 
Metal Acceptable Ball 
Cloth and beans Acceptable Blocks 
Metal Not acceptable Baseball Bat 
b.  Initial Hypothesis: The Cases Support an Inference That the Courts Look 
Only at the Specific Substance That a Toy Is Made from to Evaluate the 
Acceptability of the Toy’s Material or Composition 
An initial hypothesis could be that the courts are categorizing the toys by 
the specific kind of substance used, and that this fact alone determines whether 
a toy satisfies the factor of material or composition.  Although none of the 
courts explicitly discuss such an explanation, it is an obvious inference from the 
words “material” and “composition,” which on their face reasonably appear to 
refer to whether a toy was made of metal, plastic, or any other substance.
99
 
This explanation, though, does not test back on the seven relevant cases 
and therefore must be discarded as outside the reasonable zone of right 
explanations for the courts‟ approach.100  First, it does not test back on the facts 
and results of all the cases because it cannot explain why the Baseball Bat case 
and the Ball case reached opposite conclusions when the toys in front of both 
courts were made from the same substance.  In the Ball case, the court found a 
metal ball acceptable, but in the Baseball Bat case, the court found a metal 
baseball bat unacceptable.  Unless these two decisions are simply irrational, the 
courts must have been influenced by more than the mere fact that the toys in 
front of them were made from metal, even though neither court articulated what 
specifically influenced its decision. 
Second, this explanation does not clarify why the main factor of material 
or composition helps the court with its explicitly articulated policy concerns.  
Only by investigating the specific nature of a toy‟s substance can the court 
determine whether it would likely “lacerate, knock unconscious, or otherwise 
seriously injure young children if the object encountered their bodies.” 
                                                                                                                 
 99. At some point in the analysis, the lawyer must decide whether to use the courts‟ label of “material” 
or “composition.”  Both terms test back on the cases, and therefore are accurate descriptions for this first 
factor.  Thus, the lawyer would pick the term that best communicated the courts‟ meaning. 
 100. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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Recognizing that this hypothesis is outside the zone of reasonable 
explanations is critical to an accurate prediction of how a court would view the 
acceptability of the client‟s proposed toy design.  Under the discarded 
hypothesis that the courts evaluate only the specific substance used, the client‟s 
truck made from rubber would automatically satisfy the material or composition 
factor under the Toy Sword case, in which the toy made of rubber was found 
not dangerous.  A lawyer who is unable to follow a careful methodology for 
working with inferential reasoning, then, might initially reach a faulty 
conclusion about the analysis that these cases reasonably support, and might 
then reach an equally faulty conclusion on how a future court would view the 
client‟s design.101 
By using the appropriate methodology, in contrast, the lawyer would 
discard this initial explanation and continue to work with the cases to determine 
exactly what it is about a toy‟s material or composition that helps prevent harm 
to young children, and therefore makes it acceptable.  This refinement lays the 
foundation for a more accurate prediction on a future court‟s reaction to his 
client‟s design.102 
c.  Hypothesis: The Cases Support an Inference That the Courts, When 
Concluding That the Material or Composition Is Acceptable or 
Unacceptable, Use Two or More Sub-factors to Evaluate the Specific 
Characteristics of the Substance a Toy Is Made from 
The lawyer might hypothesize at this point that the main factor of material 
or composition depends upon an evaluation of sub-factors that address specific 
characteristics of the substance a toy is made from.  In testing back this idea on 
the seven cases‟ explicit ideas, the lawyer will realize that the Frisbee case, in 
fact, unambiguously refers to “[t]he attributes of the material the toy is made 
of.”  The plural “attributes” supports the inference that the court in this case 
viewed the general category of material or composition as breaking down into 
two or more specific aspects of the substance.  The question then becomes just 
what attributes the seven cases implicitly support because none of the seven 
courts explicitly investigates this idea further. 
i.  Charting out the Courts’ Decisions as a Foundation to Inferring What 
Specific Attributes of a Toy’s Material or Composition May Be Implicit in 
the Seven Decisions 
As a first step to hypothesizing the sub-factors, the lawyer should address 
particular attributes of a toy‟s material or composition that are implicit in these 
cases and again charts out, in a more detailed fashion, the facts and results of 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
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the seven cases.  The attorney must first look to the materials or compositions 
that were found acceptable and then to those that were not. 
 
Chart 2 
Material or Composition Determination Case Name 
Soft, lightweight plastic Acceptable Frisbee 
Soft cloth and stuffing Acceptable Beanie Baby 
Lightweight, firm rubber Acceptable Toy Sword 
Lightweight, rigid plastic Acceptable Nesting Boxes 
Lightweight, hard metal Acceptable Ball 
Soft cloth and a heavy mixture 
of beans 
Acceptable Blocks 
Heavy, rigid metal Not acceptable Baseball Bat 
ii.  Hypothesis: The Cases Support an Inference That the Courts Use a Sub-
factor That Evaluates the Flexibility of the Toy’s Substance, in Terms of Its 
Soft or Hard Nature 
As a next step, the lawyer might hypothesize that, when evaluating the 
toy‟s material or composition, the courts are concerned with the flexibility of 
the substance used, in terms of its soft or hard nature.
103
  The lawyer might 
further hypothesize that the courts find the toy‟s material acceptable when it is 
soft and do not find it acceptable when it is hard. 
The lawyer would have likely come up with this explanation by reading 
the cases and using Chart 2 to discover the ideas that appear to run through the 
cases on whether the facts satisfy the main factor of material or composition.
104
 
 For instance, the lawyer might focus on the terms used to describe many of the 
toys, even though the courts never explicitly identify the flexibility of the 
substance as a sub-factor in their analysis. The lawyer might notice that two 
cases use the term “soft”: the Frisbee case (soft plastic) and the Blocks case 
(soft cloth).  In contrast, four cases use either the word “hard” or words that are 
arguably synonyms: the Ball case (hard metal); the Toy Sword case (firm 
                                                                                                                 
 103. The lawyer might have begun with this hypothesis, or with the hypothesis that the weight of the toy 
was a factor.  Again, most legal analyses have many junctures at which different lawyers could legitimately 
choose to take one step over another, yet would ultimately reach the same result.  See supra note 91. 
 104. Professors Romantz and Vinson discussed this kind of synthesis that requires inferring a general 
principle of law from the facts of a group of cases: 
[This kind of c]ase synthesis requires extrapolating the common significance among the critical 
facts of several cases.  Identify the common thread among the cases by extrapolating the critical 
facts from the numerous precedents until some commonality is identified.  This commonality 
should be a characteristic that is shared by the critical facts in all of the precedents. The 
commonality found, however, must be germane to the reasoning and holdings of the precedent. 
ROMANTZ & VINSON, supra note 13, at 40; see also VANDEVELDE, supra note 7, at 50-51 (discussing 
“judgments concerning which facts to include in the factual predicate and the level of generality at which to 
state a rule” when synthesizing implicit ideas from a group of cases). 
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rubber); the Nesting Boxes case (rigid plastic); and the Baseball Bat case (rigid 
metal). 
The lawyer would likely conclude that this hypothesis also makes sense in 
terms of the courts‟ explicit policy concerns.  Again, in the Frisbee case, the 
court fully spelled out its reasoning on its concerns about the danger toys pose 
for young children: “Whether a product would tend to lacerate, knock 
unconscious, or otherwise seriously injure young children if the object 
encountered their bodies.”  Clearly, the flexibility of the substance used, in 
terms of its soft or hard nature, would either increase or decrease the risk of 
knocking children unconscious or otherwise seriously injuring young children if 
the object encountered their bodies. 
But tested back on not only the facts but also the results of the cases, this 
hypothesis does not fall within a reasonable zone of right explanations for the 
analysis these seven courts were implicitly using.
105
  In fact, the pattern of the 
courts‟ decisions contradicts an explanation that only toys made from a soft 
substance will be found not dangerous and those from a hard or rigid substance 
will be automatically labeled as dangerous. 
The courts do find a toy‟s material or composition acceptable if the 
substance used is soft—a soft plastic Frisbee; “blocks made out of soft cloth”; 
and a Beanie Baby stuffed animal that is made of cloth and therefore implicitly 
soft.  However, whether a toy was made of a substance that was hard or rigid 
turns out not to be dispositive of whether the court viewed the toy‟s material or 
composition as acceptable. For instance, a baseball bat of rigid metal was 
dangerous, but a ball of hard metal and nesting boxes of rigid plastic did not 
make the toys‟ material or composition unacceptable. 
Thus, by testing back this hypothesis, the lawyer is able to conclude that 
the courts do seem to focus on the attribute of flexibility of the substance, in 
terms of its hard or soft nature, but that this attribute by itself cannot 
sufficiently explain the results in these seven cases, and that once again the 
lawyer must continue with the analysis. 
iii.  Hypothesis: The Cases Support an Inference That, in Addition to 
Flexibility, the Courts Evaluate the Weight of the Substance 
Reading these cases, and working with Chart 2 again, might cause the 
lawyer to wonder whether the weight of the substance used, in addition to its 
flexibility, might be important when evaluating the toy‟s material or 
composition.  None of the courts in the seven cases explicitly identify the 
weight of the material as an important idea in their analysis, yet language in 
some of the decisions describing the toys before the courts and the courts‟ 
policy concerns suggest an inference that the toys‟ weights were an important 
motivating factor in the courts‟ decisions. 
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When beginning to work with this possible sub-factor, the lawyer might 
initially focus on the cases in which the court explicitly describes the toy with 
the designation “lightweight” or “heavy.”  That these courts describe the toy in 
this manner indicates their possible reliance on the weight of the substance 
when deciding whether the toy‟s material or composition is acceptable, even 
though none of the courts explicitly identified this idea as a particular piece of 
their analysis. 
The lawyer might then evaluate the pattern of decisions, in relation to the 
courts‟ explicit policy concerns, to gather possible support for the inference that 
the courts are using this sub-factor of weight.   The lawyer might first compare 
the Baseball Bat case with the Ball case.  In the Baseball Bat case, the court 
describes the toy as a “heavy, rigid metal baseball bat” and finds the toy 
dangerous because of its composition.  In contrast, in the Ball case, the court 
finds a “ball of lightweight, hard metal” not dangerous because “metal is not 
always a dangerous material for toys for young children.”  The difference in the 
results of these two cases, the lawyer will likely conclude, is the weight of the 
toy.  Both toys are made of metal, which by its nature tends to be an unyielding 
substance and which the respective courts describe as “hard” and “rigid.”  Both 
toys could, therefore, knock a child unconscious—the consistent concern of the 
courts—if they encountered the child‟s body.  This risk, however, is decreased 
if the metal is lightweight as in the Ball case, and this decrease in risk 
reasonably explains the difference between the two courts‟ decisions. 
Testing back this factor of weight on the other cases demonstrates that it is 
consistent with the decisions on the facts in the Frisbee case, the Beanie Baby 
case, and the Toy Sword case.  In these cases in which the material or 
composition was found acceptable, the toys are all described as “lightweight.”  
The Frisbee was “made of soft, lightweight plastic,” and the toy sword was 
“made of lightweight, firm rubber.”  While the court in the Beanie Baby case 
did not use the word “lightweight” to describe the toy, the lawyer may 
reasonably assume, given common knowledge, that a Beanie Baby is a small 
stuffed animal that is filled with material that is always lightweight.
106
 
However, comparing the decisions in the Nesting Boxes case and the 
Blocks case illustrates that this sub-factor of weight, even though apparently 
important to the courts‟ analysis, could not be dispositive by itself.  Courts in 
both of these cases found the toy‟s material or composition acceptable, but the 
substance used was not necessarily lightweight.  In the Nesting Boxes case, the 
toy was made from plastic that was lightweight but rigid.  In contrast, in the 
Blocks case, the toy was filled with a heavy mixture of beans but made with soft 
                                                                                                                 
 106. There is a critical difference between using an easily verified a fact that is common knowledge and 
assuming a fact that is not before the court.  Here, a Beanie Baby is a particular kind of stuffed animal that is 
verifiably small and light.  Therefore, making an assumption here is quite different from the situation in which 
a court simply has a toy before it described generally as a “stuffed animal.”  With such a general description, 
the toy could be large or small, and filled with different kinds of material; therefore, the lawyer could not 
assume that the toy was either heavy or light. 
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cloth.  This pattern of decisions provides conclusive evidence that the 
acceptability of a toy‟s material or composition does not solely depend upon its 
being lightweight, and raises a question concerning the precise relationship of 
the weight of the substance and the substance‟s flexibility, in terms of its soft or 
hard nature. 
iv.  Hypothesis: The Cases Support an Inference That, for the Toy’s 
Material or Composition to Be Acceptable, the Courts Require Only That a 
Toy’s Substance Satisfy the Weight Sub-factor or the Flexibility Sub-factor 
At this point in the analysis, the lawyer would have likely developed a 
strong sense that the relationship between these two implicit sub-factors of 
weight and flexibility must be confronted.
107
  While working through the 
hypotheses on each of these sub-factors, the lawyer would have probably begun 
to suspect that neither sub-factor by itself was dispositive of the courts‟ ultimate 
conclusions on the acceptability of the toys‟ material or composition.  The 
Baseball Bat case illustrated that rigid and heavy material was not acceptable, 
while the Frisbee and Beanie Baby cases, respectively, illustrated that soft and 
lightweight material was acceptable. 
However, the other four cases involved toys made of materials that were 
either soft and heavy or hard and lightweight, and in both of these situations, 
the courts found the toys‟ material or composition acceptable.  In two cases the 
material was hard but lightweight—nesting boxes made of plastic that was rigid 
but lightweight and a ball made of hard but lightweight metal.  And in another 
case the material was heavy but soft—blocks made of soft cloth but filled with 
a heavy mixture of beans. 
Thus, the pattern of these decisions reveals that the courts only require a 
toy to satisfy one of the two sub-factors of weight and flexibility for its material 
or composition to be acceptable.  This hypothesis not only explains the pattern 
of the seven decisions but also fits with the courts‟ expressed concerns about 
toys injuring young children.  In general, toys that satisfy one or both sub-
factors would be less likely to “lacerate, knock unconscious, or otherwise 
seriously injure young children if the object encountered their bodies.”  This 
delicate balance is tipped to unacceptable, however, when the toy‟s substance is 
both heavy and hard, as in the Baseball Bat case when the court found a heavy, 
rigid metal baseball bat to be dangerous. 
In terms of the client‟s proposed toy truck, the lawyer would conclude that 
the analysis to this point indicates that the truck‟s material or composition is 
acceptable because it satisfies one of the two sub-factors.  While the rubber is 
heavy and therefore would not satisfy the weight sub-factor, the heavy rubber is 
also soft and therefore would satisfy the flexibility sub-factor. 
                                                                                                                 
 107. The lawyer could have reasonably confronted the relationship between the two sub-factors of weight 
and flexibility earlier in the analysis.  See supra note 91. 
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3.  Analyzing a Second Main Factor, in Addition to the Factor of Material 
or Composition 
a.  Initial Hypothesis: The Cases Support an Inference That the Courts Use 
a Factor Evaluating the Toy’s Shape, Particularly in Terms of Whether It Is 
Rounded or Has Angles 
Despite the analysis so far, the lawyer would probably have a strong sense 
that the analysis is still incomplete and cannot yet adequately predict whether 
the courts will view the client‟s proposed truck as dangerous.  When continuing 
to work with the cases, the lawyer might next hypothesize that, in addition to a 
toy‟s material or composition, the courts might also consider a toy‟s shape. 
The lawyer might have considered other factors when he read statements 
in the cases that support such an inference.  For instance, the court in the 
Frisbee case states that “[t]he attributes of the material a toy is made of are 
among the primary motivating factors” when determining a toy‟s danger to 
young children.  The court‟s use of the word “primary” indicates that the toy‟s 
material or composition is important, but its use of the plural “factors” indicates 
that there could be additional aspects of a toy‟s design that might affect the 
court‟s conclusion. 
Phrasing in the Toy Sword case also supports this possibility.  In that case, 
the court stated that “the fact that the toy is made with this material helps 
prevent, among other things, the object from harming young children.”  The 
word “helps” in relation to “among other things” shows that the factor being 
applied in the case —the material the toy was made of—was not the only factor 
that could prevent harm to young children. 
More specific evidence is found in the two-tier structure of the decision in 
the Nesting Boxes case and the court‟s reasoning.  In that case, the court found 
the nesting boxes‟ composition of lightweight, rigid plastic acceptable but went 
on to find the toy dangerous because the boxes‟ “angled corners create a toy 
that might injure young children.”  The explicit reference to “angled corners” 
supports the inference that the court in this case found the toy‟s shape 
unacceptable because the angles on the corners of the boxes contravened the 
courts‟ articulated policy concerns. 
A factor of shape is not only generally consistent with these policy 
concerns but also addresses specific aspects of “danger to young children” that 
the factor of material or composition does not.  The substance that a toy is made 
of, including its flexibility and weight, affects whether the toy would knock a 
young child unconscious, but neither sub-factor measures whether the toy 
would lacerate the child—an important aspect of the courts‟ articulated 
concerns.  In contrast, the proposed factor of shape—whether the toy was 
rounded or angled—makes more sense when assessing whether a toy might 
lacerate a child. 
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However, the possibility of this second factor still must test back on the 
facts and results of all seven cases.  The following chart would help with this 
process:  
 
Chart 3 
Material or Composition Shape Determination Case Name 
Soft, lightweight plastic Round Not dangerous Frisbee 
Soft cloth and stuffing No angles Not dangerous Beanie Baby 
Lightweight, firm rubber 
Rounded 
edges 
Not dangerous 
Toy Sword 
Lightweight, hard metal Round Not dangerous Ball 
Soft cloth and a heavy 
mixture of beans 
Oval Not dangerous 
Blocks 
Heavy, rigid metal Rounded Dangerous Baseball Bat 
Lightweight, rigid  plastic 
Angled 
corners 
Dangerous Nesting 
Boxes 
 
The facts and decisions from the Frisbee, Beanie Baby, Toy Sword, Ball, 
Blocks, and Baseball Bat cases reasonably support the possibility of a second 
factor of shape, even though none of the courts openly discussed or decided 
whether the toy before the court satisfies this factor.  For one thing, the facts of 
these cases are based on toys with a rounded shape that did not have angles.  In 
some cases, the courts explicitly described the shape of the toy.  In the Toy 
Sword case, the court specifically noted that the toy had “a rounded handle and 
sword tip,” and the court in the Blocks case described the toy as “oval.”  In the 
other four cases, the toys‟ shapes are common knowledge.  Everyone knows 
that the Frisbee and the metal ball are round, that the baseball bat is rounded, 
and that the Beanie Baby is made out of cloth and therefore has no angles. 
These facts, in relationship to the courts‟ policy concerns, explain why the 
six courts did not look beyond the material or composition and discuss the issue 
of shape, while the court in the Nesting Boxes case did.  In the Frisbee, Beanie 
Baby, Toy Sword, Ball, Blocks, and Baseball Bat cases, the toys before the 
courts had shapes that were rounded and without any angles.  The toys‟ shape 
did not raise specific concerns about injuries to young children and therefore 
made it unnecessary for the courts to discuss the toys‟ shape in considering the 
toys‟ potential dangerousness.  In contrast, the court in the Nesting Boxes case 
was confronted with a toy that had angled corners, a shape that raised a red flag 
in relationship to safety for young children.  The court, therefore, proceeded to 
evaluate the shape of the toy, despite the fact that it had already found the toy‟s 
material or composition acceptable. 
No single piece of evidence discussed above is sufficient to indicate that 
the courts in these seven cases were applying a second factor of shape.  These 
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pieces taken together, however, strongly support the inference that the courts 
were considering shape, even though none of these courts did so explicitly.
108
 
b.  Hypothesis: The Cases Support More Than One Possible Explanation of 
the Precise Analytical Relationship Between the Factors of Material or 
Composition and Shape 
The question, then, would arise about the precise relationship between the 
two main factors of material or composition and shape of the toy.  The lawyer 
would likely conclude that two possible relationships could be reasonably 
supported by the seven cases.
109
  One reasonable inference could be that the 
courts were using the material or composition factor as a threshold requirement, 
and only if this first factor was satisfied—either by the sub-factor of weight or 
the sub-factor of flexibility—would the courts proceed to evaluate a second 
factor of shape.  A second reasonable inference could be that the courts were 
first evaluating the material or composition factor, and if the court found that 
the toy‟s substance was hard or rigid but satisfied the material or composition 
sub-factor of weight, it would evaluate whether the hard or rigid nature 
interacted with the toy‟s shape to create a toy that was too dangerous for young 
children.  The fact that there are two possible interpretations of the relationship 
between these two factors would be important to the lawyer‟s predicting how a 
future court would evaluate the client‟s toy and, therefore, how the lawyer 
would advise the client on liability issues arising from its proposed design for 
the toy truck. 
The structure of the court‟s decision in the Nesting Boxes case, the only 
decision that directly addresses the relationship between the two factors, 
indicates the following possible relationship: The material or composition 
factor is a threshold requirement, and only if this first factor is satisfied will the 
court proceed to separately evaluate a second factor of shape.  The court in this 
case began by evaluating the nesting boxes‟ material or composition.  Only 
after finding the toy‟s material or composition acceptable did the court go on to 
decide that the toy was still dangerous on the basis that the shape—the toy‟s 
angled corners—made the toy more likely to injure young children.  This 
reading of the Nesting Boxes case is consistent with the fact that the toys in the 
other six cases all had shapes that were rounded with no angles and therefore 
did not raise the same concerns about a toy‟s shape.  For this reason, these 
courts would not have explicitly addressed the factor of shape and thus reached 
a decision on this issue.
110
 
Given that only one of the seven cases directly raised this issue of shape, 
another explanation of the relationship of shape to the factor of material or 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 109. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 110. The court in the Baseball Bat case had already decided that the toy‟s material or composition was 
dangerous, and therefore it did not need to analyze the bat‟s shape. 
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composition could fall within the reasonable zone of right explanations.
111
  For 
instance, the lawyer might hypothesize that a court would first evaluate the 
toy‟s material or composition.  If the court then found that the toy‟s substance 
was acceptable because it satisfied the sub-factor of weight but not the sub-
factor of flexibility, the court would then proceed to evaluate the rigid or hard 
nature of the substance in relationship to the rounded or angled shape of the 
toy. 
The Nesting Boxes case also supports this second hypothesis.  There, the 
boxes had a composition of lightweight, rigid plastic, which the court found 
was acceptable on the implicit basis that one of the two sub-factors of material 
or composition was sufficient.  The sub-factor of weight was satisfied because 
the plastic was lightweight, and therefore, it did not matter that the boxes‟ 
plastic was rigid.  Despite the fact that the composition was acceptable, the 
court might have been influenced by the fact that the rigid nature of the plastic 
would have arguably increased the danger to young children in specific 
relationship to the boxes‟ angled corners.  Under this hypothesis, the court 
moved on to evaluate shape only because something in the material or 
composition analysis triggered this second inquiry. 
This second explanation of the relationship between these two factors also 
explains why the Nesting Boxes case is the only case that directly addresses the 
factor of shape.  In three of the other cases, the substance used was not hard or 
rigid, and therefore, this issue of shape would not have been raised.  In two 
other cases, the substance used was hard or rigid, but the toys‟ shapes were 
rounded and had no angles, and so, again, the issue would not have been the 
focus of the courts‟ concern.  In the final case, the court found that the baseball 
bat failed both sub-factors of material or composition because it was made of 
heavy and rigid metal.  The bat was already considered a toy that directly 
conflicted with the courts‟ policy concerns; therefore, the rounded nature of the 
bat‟s shape was irrelevant. 
This second possibility of the courts‟ relying on shape when the toy‟s 
substance is hard or rigid would be consistent with the courts‟ concern for the 
safety of young children. However, given the seven cases in the jurisdiction to 
date, there is no way to be sure which approach the courts might take. Though 
the courts in all the cases except the Nesting Boxes case begin their analyses 
with the factor of material or composition, they provide little definitive 
guidance on the relationship between this first factor and the possible second 
factor of shape. 
In addition, the Nesting Boxes case has insufficient explicit reasoning to 
allow a lawyer to predict the actual analysis the court was using.  On the one 
hand, the court might have considered the factors of material or composition 
and shape independent—the first as a threshold requirement for the second.  On 
the other hand, the court might have decided that the toy‟s lightweight but rigid 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See Gionfriddo, supra note 1, at 432-33; supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. 
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substance satisfied the material or composition factor, yet still could have found 
that the rigid nature of the plastic triggered an evaluation of the toy‟s shape 
with particular attention given to any angles in the rigid material and whether 
they created any sharp aspects to the toy.  Thus, the lawyer would have to 
conclude that the reasonable zone of right explanations could include more than 
one possible explanation of the relationship between these two factors. 
The lawyer would be unable to predict how a future court in this 
jurisdiction would view the design of the client‟s toy truck because the 
reasonable zone includes more than one possible explanation.  If the court 
analyzes these two factors separately, the court might label the truck a 
dangerous toy for young children.  The truck would satisfy the first factor of 
material or composition because its rubber would satisfy one of the two sub-
factors.  While the rubber is heavy and thus does not appear to satisfy the sub-
factor of weight, it is also soft and does meet the sub-factor of flexibility in 
terms of its hard or soft nature.  However, the truck might not meet the second 
factor of shape if it is evaluated separately from material or composition.  The 
truck is designed with a rounded cab section but with an open truck bed that is 
square in shape.  If the court views any toy with angles as automatically 
increasing the possibility of injuries to young children, then the truck will not 
satisfy this second factor. 
On the other hand, the lawyer could advise his client that the design of the 
proposed toy truck would not be problematic if an evaluation of the toy‟s shape 
is only triggered when the court encounters a toy whose substance is hard or 
rigid.  Again, the truck was made of soft rubber and not from a hard or rigid 
substance.  The fact that the composition of the toy truck would not trigger the 
second inquiry of shape makes sense—given the truck‟s overall composition, 
the angles on the truck bed would probably not raise specific concerns that the 
truck would present a high likelihood of lacerating children. 
4.  Analyzing a Possible Factor That Evaluates a Toy’s Use by Young 
Children 
a. Hypothesis: The Cases Support an Inference That the Courts Use a Third 
Factor That Evaluates How Children Use the Toy 
It might also occur to the lawyer that the courts were using a third main 
factor to assess the dangerousness of a toy—the use of the toy.  This 
consideration makes sense because the normal use of a toy, or how it is 
designed to be used, could directly affect whether certain materials and certain 
shapes would result in a toy with the potential to “lacerate, knock unconscious, 
or otherwise seriously injure young children.” 
In testing back this possible factor on the seven cases, the lawyer might 
initially find support in the Toy Sword court‟s explicit reference to the phrase 
“helps prevent, among other things,” as well as to the Frisbee court‟s phrasing 
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of “one of the primary motivating factors.”  This explicit phrasing in both cases 
supports the inference that courts are considering the use of the toy as a 
factor—just as those phrases did for the prior hypothesis that the courts were 
using the factor of shape. 
Despite these general references, however, the cases do not support an 
inference that the courts use a factor that evaluates the use of the toy.  First, 
none of the seven cases includes any facts indicating how a toy was used or 
designed to be used.  Without this foundation, testing back the hypothesis on 
the cases has little meaning, even though none of the cases‟ facts and decisions 
actually contradict the possibility of a third factor.  In comparison, the factor of 
shape was better supported because of how some of the courts explicitly 
described the toys. 
Second, the explicit rationale of the courts—their policy concerns—does 
not specifically address the use of toys or why such a factor would measure the 
danger to young children.  Instead, the courts merely state that they are 
concerned with whether the toy would “lacerate, knock unconscious, or 
otherwise seriously injure young children if the object encountered their 
bodies.”  This hypothesis is therefore unlike the court‟s analysis in the Frisbee 
case in which it directly linked up the “material a toy is made of” to “whether a 
product would tend to lacerate, knock unconscious, or otherwise seriously 
injure young children.”  It is also unlike the court‟s analysis in the Nesting 
Boxes case in which the court connected the angled corners of the nesting boxes 
to the policy concern that such a toy “might injure young children.” 
Thus, this hypothesis must be discarded because it is insufficiently 
supported by the seven relevant cases in the jurisdiction because these cases do 
not explicitly raise, or even implicitly support, the possibility that the courts 
were considering a toy‟s use.  This is true even though the idea of a toy‟s use is 
lurking behind the courts‟ analyses in these cases and even though the courts 
will probably incorporate such a factor in the future as they develop their 
approach to this area of law.
112
 
For these reasons, a lawyer could make creative arguments to a future 
court that the law of the jurisdiction should include such a factor.  While an 
analysis of the current status of law could not reasonably incorporate such an 
inference, a lawyer could argue to change or develop the current law to include 
an evaluation of a toy‟s use.113  This argument might be persuasive and 
convince the court, especially if it were based on supporting analyses from 
persuasive cases from other jurisdictions and authoritative secondary authority. 
                                                                                                                 
 112. The lawyer should have also gone through the same process and come to the same conclusion about 
a possible factor of the size of the toy. 
 113. See supra Part III.C. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The hypothetical discussed in Part IV illustrates that synthesizing groups 
of cases is a complex analytical skill, one that is critical to a lawyer‟s ability to 
work with the law in a sophisticated fashion.  Only by seeing what a group of 
cases explicitly says and determining what they reasonably support inferentially 
will a lawyer develop all important ideas, including their subtle nuances.  To 
achieve this result, a lawyer must consciously think about and use a sound 
methodology.  Having done so, the lawyer will develop the depth of analysis 
necessary for high caliber law practice, regardless of what role the lawyer plays 
in the profession. 
